In latest months, rising tensions between Washington and Moscow in addition to intensified assaults in Ukraine have raised questions over the function of Russia’s neighbors, notably Kazakhstan. In Washington and Europe, leaders are actually contemplating the potential for secondary sanctions on nations discovered to be serving to Russia acquire prohibited items.
In trying to obtain these targets, EU lawmakers have already handed laws for an eleventh sanctions bundle that will mandate sanctions on corporations and people in third nations which might be discovered to be serving to Russia circumvent sanctions. The nations of Central Asia, specifically Kazakhstan, have been named by EU officers as doable targets of this bundle.
In line with a latest report by the European Financial institution for Reconstruction and Growth (EBRD) exports from the EU, U.Ok., and U.S. to Kazakhstan elevated by greater than 80 p.c in 2022 whereas, throughout the identical interval, Kazakhstan elevated its exports to Russia by greater than 22 p.c. A latest investigation launched by OCCRP (the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Undertaking), along with Essential Tales (Russia), Der Spiegel (Germany), and Vlast (Kazakhstan) revealed that Kazakhstan has turn into a transit level for the import of digital elements and different dual-use items to Russia, that are then utilized by the Russian military and protection enterprises.
Tokayev’s Challenges and Guarantees
A lot of Kazakhstan’s capability to advertise and strictly observe the West’s sanctions program will rely by itself trajectory. Moscow’s affect on Astana is rooted of their long-standing historical past, important areas of mutual cooperation, and geography. As such there’s nonetheless a powerful notion in Kazakhstan that sustaining relations with Russia is useful. The significance Kazakhstan locations on Russia’s favor is mirrored by the frequency of excessive profile visits: President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has made a number of visits to Moscow previously 12 months and likewise attended the Victory Day parade final month.
The Kazakhstan-Russia relationship is formed to a big extent by geography and historical past. A shared Soviet and (partly) Tsarist previous, has created deep social, infrastructural, and enterprise hyperlinks between the 2 nations. Their lengthy border ensures that Kazakhstan and Russia are tightly interdependent in safety phrases, too. Kazakhstan is one in all Russia’s most lively buying and selling companions and a member of the Eurasian Financial Union (EAEU), a Moscow-led buying and selling bloc dominated by Russia that additionally consists of Belarus, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan’s main income comes from its oil and gasoline business, which stays extremely depending on Russia as an exporting and refining route; 80 p.c of Kazakhstan’s crude oil exports is transported to Russia’s Novorossiysk-2 marine terminal on the Black Sea to be refined and processed.
Magzum Mirzagaliyev, chairman of Kazakhstan’s nationwide oil and gasoline firm KazMunayGaz, held talks with David Reed, director for sanctions on the U.Ok. Overseas, Commonwealth and Growth Workplace, in London on June 12. The important thing level mentioned was the necessity to stop the financial fallout of Western sanctions from impacting Kazakh oil exports via Russia.
Kazakhstan can be a member of the Russian-led Collective Safety Treaty Group (CSTO), from which Tokayev requested assist amid the January 2022 protests. Home political elements additionally matter for the kind of relations that the 2 nations take pleasure in. On this respect, two points are particularly related: Kazakhstan’s massive ethnic Russian minority and similarities in regime sort.
For Kazakhstan, the secondary sanctions danger is not only hypothetical. A precedent was set in June 2022, when the US imposed secondary sanctions on an Uzbek firm concerned in exporting electrical elements to Russia. In mild of this and contemplating a latest improve in enforcement actions by U.S., EU, and U.Ok. authorities referring to the Russia-related sanctions extra usually, there’s a risk of circumstances being initiated towards individuals, banks, and firms primarily based in Kazakhstan.
The official narrative in Astana could give the impression that Kazakhstan is taking the West’s sanctions issues severely and taking duty for a way items transported via its territory are used. As a part of this broader framing effort, Kazakhstan launched a new monitoring system that supposedly would permit real-time monitoring of the whole chain of motion of products from border to frame. Tokayev and his diplomats have additionally spoken of Kazakhstan’s neutrality with larger urgency in latest months. In feedback in the course of the EAEU discussion board in Moscow, Tokayev made a degree of stressing that the “EAEU is an completely financial and never a political car.” Afterward, Tokayev’s press secretary, Ruslan Zheldibay, said that “Kazakhstan doesn’t intend to or plan to hitch any allied state.”
But this tells solely half the story. The larger image exhibits that Tokayev’s private ensures, irrespective of how honest, haven’t helped totally cease the re-sale of dual-use items to Russia. This commerce continues to accentuate and in actuality, there seems to be an absence of devoted effort by the Kazakh authorities to fight the problem of parallel commerce via its territory. A living proof is that Kazakh banks proceed to situation Kazakh particular person identification numbers (IIN) to Russian nationals with out them truly needing to be within the nation in particular person. This IIN provides its holder the chance to do enterprise and interact in commerce within the nation. In line with the Kazakh authorities, the full variety of Russian taxpayers registered in Kazakhstan final 12 months was round 70,000; in the present day it’s estimated between 300,000 to 1 million. Nevertheless given the dearth of transparency of knowledge, this statistic could possibly be a lot increased. Many small companies in Kazakhstan have additionally made robust earnings off the sanctions on Russia by sourcing items that Russian corporations are unable to acquire straight.
Secondary Sanctions: Closing the Loophole
Secondary sanctions are a reasonably new mechanism established by the US within the final 5 years or so, notably referring to Iran. Some of these sanctions as Jack Lew, the previous U.S. treasury secretary, stated in 2016, “usually [are directed] in the direction of overseas individuals. These measures threaten to chop off overseas people or corporations from the U.S. monetary system in the event that they have interaction in sure conduct with a sanctioned entity, even when none of that exercise touches the U.S. straight.” As famous in Bloomberg, “the imposition of secondary sanctions is supposed to drive corporations, banks, and people to make a troublesome selection: proceed doing enterprise with the sanctioned entity or with the U.S., however not each.” Due to the dominance of the U.S. greenback as a retailer of worth within the world economic system, most corporations prioritize conserving good relations with the US.
The aim of a spherical of secondary sanctions can be to aim to strain Kazakh officers to push internally for a change in coverage. The U.S. and till not too long ago, the EU, are the 2 fundamental actors which have a secondary sanctions coverage in place. In June, the EU’s eleventh sanctions bundle was handed with a give attention to combating the circumvention of pre-existing commerce sanctions somewhat than introducing new bans. It is very important observe that the U.S. and EU secondary sanctions intention to focus on corporations, banks, and people (somewhat than nations) which might be suspected of undermining the effectiveness of sanctions. Nonetheless, it stays unclear whether or not secondary sanctions on Kazakhstan’s companies, banks, and people suspected of serving to Russia would compel a change in coverage. Enterprise leaders arguably have essentially the most to lose, since disruptions in commerce and funding with Western companions will have an effect on companies at first.
Conclusion
Given the depth of financial ties between Astana and Moscow, secondary sanctions towards companies, people, and banks in Kazakhstan could possibly be extremely pricey for his or her economic system. With solely blended Kazakh assist, closing the loopholes could possibly be tough to attain. Western policymakers must give attention to areas the place Russia is asymmetrically depending on overseas items, expertise, and finance that come via Kazakhstan. If secondary sanctions had been to be carried out, Western leaders would wish to make sure that credible threats are matched with credible assurances. With the U.S. and the EU asserting a shift of their gaze to Kazakhstan and Central Asia extra broadly, these developments can even be carefully noticed by Russia.
In opposition to this backdrop, Astana doesn’t see the selection in entrance of it as a binary one, and desires to keep away from turning into a bit on the proverbial geopolitical chessboard pushed round by bigger powers. As an alternative, Kazakhstan seeks to keep up constructive relationships with two behemoths — a balancing act, for positive, however a manageable and mandatory one from their standpoint.